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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the disclosure practices in the Annual Reports of the Banco de
Espan˜a spanning the period 1872 to 1894. Although established as a privately owned
bank, the Banco de Espan˜a developed a close and increasingly symbiotic relationship
with the Spanish State during the nineteenth century. This relationship was further
strengthened in 1874 when the State conferred upon the Bank the exclusive right to
issue bank notes for use throughout the country. With this privilege, the relationship
between the Bank and the State was sealed. The paper argues that it was more this
relationship rather than factors associated with it size, nature of operations or the nature
of its competitive environment that in uenced the disclosure practices of the Bank.
1. INTRODUCTION
Accounting historians have shown increasing interest in investigating accounting
and disclosure practices prevalent during the nineteenth century (Michael, 1996;
Previts and Samson, 2000; Storrar and Pratt, 2000; Jones, 1992; Toms, 1998). In
the light of the low regulatory regime that characterized this accounting
environment, it is generally felt that the nineteenth century context presents a
potentially useful laboratory for examining the non regulatory motives for
accounting disclosure and resultant studies could make valuable contributions
to the ongoing debates on accounting regulation. Whilst this emerging body of
research has enhanced our understanding of such practices, and has provided
important insights into the broader processes involved in the production of
accounting information, much of this research has focused on Anglo American
settings. Unsurprisingly therefore, given the signi cance of shareholder equity
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 nancing in these contexts, the competing theories which have emerged all link
nineteenth century  nancial reporting practices to phenomena related to the
separation of ownership and control (Edwards, 1989; Watts and Zimmerman,
1979; Bryer, 1993; Toms, 1998).1 To date little is known about the nature of and
motives behind such practices in contexts where this variable may have been
absent or relatively weak and, as a result, questions relating to the existence and
nature of non capital market motives for accounting disclosures have yet to be
answered.
This paper, by examining the  nancial reporting practices of the Banco de
Espana during the twenty two year period spanning 1872 94, will explore this
issue. At the same time it aims to contribute to our growing stock of knowledge
on nineteenth century disclosure practices by drawing attention to the Spanish
nineteenth century environment, an environment for which the scarcity of such
evidence has already been acknowledged (Herna´ndez Esteve, 1995).
The Banco de Espana was the  rst bank to be established in Spain, and until
1844 it was the only bank in the country (Garcia Lopez, 2000). The majority of
its shares were privately held by a small powerful elite that dominated the
political, military, administrative and commercial spheres of nineteenth century
Spanish life (Carasa, 1999). Thus by focusing attention on this organization, the
paper will not only be investigating the early reporting practices of the oldest and
most in uential institution in the Spanish  nancial sector, but also one for which
the well established capital market determinants of  nancial disclosure were
virtually non existent. The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. The
following section gives a brief historical review of the Banco de Espana, setting it
within the context of the mid nineteenth century Spanish banking system.
Importantly the section aims to highlight the increasingly symbiotic relationship
that developed between the Bank and the Spanish State a relationship which we
later argue is central to understanding the observed disclosure practices of the
Bank. Section 3 presents a review of the Bank’s Annual Reports for the period
1874 94 and in the subsequent section the factors which may have given rise to
the nature and levels of disclosure in these reports are discussed. Finally we
develop a conclusion to our work.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A developing relationship with the State
From its inception the Banco de Espana had always enjoyed a close relationship
with the Spanish State. Its earliest predecessor the Banco Nacional de San
Carlos established in 1782 under Royal decree was the of cial bank of the
Spanish Crown and was vested with the remit to administer the public debt. By the
early decades of the nineteenth century as the ‘San Carlos’ faced certain bank
ruptcy, it was the State that came to its rescue.2 By investing some 77.4 million
pesetas, it established (in 1829) the Banco Espanol de San Fernando which
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through a share for share exchange with the then existing shareholders of the ‘San
Carlos’, took over the operations of the beleaguered ‘San Carlos’. In return, for all
of its nineteen year life, the operations of the Banco Espanol de San Fernando
were devoted almost exclusively to government lending (Tortella, 1995).
On two other occasions during the mid nineteenth century, the State was forced
to intervene in an attempt to rescue the fortunes of this serially beleaguered
institution. The  rst was in 1848, with the state engineered merger between the
‘San Fernando’ and the Banco Isabel II.3 This gave rise to the Nuevo Banco
Espanol de San Fernando which only eight years later with the passage of the
1856 Law of Emission was transformed into the Banco de Espana with the
specially conferred privilege to issue bank notes. It was this second intervention
the granting of the right to issue bank notes which  nally brought stability to
the Bank’s operations and which laid the foundation for its ultimate dominance
within the Spanish banking sector throughout the remainder of the century and
beyond.
The organization of the mid-nineteenth-century Spanish banking
sector
The 1856 passage of the Law of Emission marked a critical turning point in the
Spanish banking system. The Law dichotomized banking institutions into two
mutually exclusive categories. Bancos de emisio´n which had the right to issue
bank notes; and sociedades de cre´dito which were organized to operate as
commercial banks and were free to involve themselves in all classes of banking
business except the issue of bank notes. With the passage of the law, the Banco de
Espana along with two other banks the Banco de Barcelona and the Banco de
Ca´diz fell into the former category. Accompanying their special privilege was
the requirement that they maintain suf cient reserves in metals (gold and silver)
and that they limit their activities to short term lending.
The introduction of the new 1856 law was part of a wider system of monetary
reform aimed at bringing stability and order to a monetary system plagued with
perennial crisis, chaos and instability. At this time a variety of coinages were in
use and this, coupled with a high level of public debt, and chronic instability of
banks created uncertainty, confusion and low public con dence in the system.
Accordingly the cost of transacting was high (Anes, 1974) and to compound this,
by the 1850s the price of gold on the international market had plummeted
(Tortella, 1995) giving rise to a contraction of the money supply and a
corresponding shrinkage of the banking sector. It was therefore hoped that
with the formal introduction of bank notes as a medium of exchange, these
critical ills would be alleviated.
The measures were met with partial success. By the 1860s, less than ten years
after these reforms, the banking system had witnessed phenomenal growth. The
number of bancos de emisio´n had increased from the original three to twenty, and
there were some thirty  ve sociedades de cre´dito (Tortella, 1995). In 1863, in
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Madrid alone there were seven sociedades de cre´dito (Comellas, 1996: 227).
Moreover, the activities of individual banks also witnessed phenomenal growth.
For instance, whereas in 1856 the Banco de Espana issued notes to the value of
39 million pesetas, by 1860 this had risen to 66 million pesetas. Likewise the
Banco de Barcelona had issued 2.6 million pesetas in bank notes in 1856; by
1861 this  gure had reached 15 million pesetas (Comellas, 1996: 227). These
events in turn led to a substantial increase in the money supply during the period
1856 60, a corresponding decline in interest rates (Herna´ndez, 1996: 152), and a
general increase in the volume of economic activity for the period. But this
expansionary trend was short lived. By the mid 1860s the system was once again
in crisis. This was in part attributed to the lack of diversi cation of banking
activities (Tortella, 1995). The system envisaged that while on the one hand the
bancos de emisio´n would con ne their activities exclusively to short term lending
transactions,4 sociedades de cre´dito on the other would offer a full range of
banking facilities and devote a substantial part of their activities to long term
lending. These latter institutions instead concentrated their activities heavily
towards the railroad industry almost to the exclusion of any other activities.
Thus when in 1864, it was discovered that railroads were unlikely to be a viable
business (Tortella, 1995; Comellas, 1996: 227), many of these banks suspended
payments and closed permanently leaving millions of debts unpaid
(Tortella, 1995). This crisis was closely followed by the crashes of the Barcelona
and Madrid stock markets and, to aggravate these problems, in 1868 a revolution
broke out. As a consequence, the period of the mid 1860s to the mid 1870s was
marked by a steady contraction of the banking sector. By 1873, therefore, the
number of bancos de emisio´n had declined to  fteen and there were fewer than
ten sociedades de cre´dito.
In the six years following the 1868 Revolution, the Spanish political scene was
marked by the confusion and instability, which had characterized its banking
sector. During this six year period there were eighteen different governments.
This was a period also characterized successively by: a dethronement; a provi
sional regime; a regencia; a democratic monarchy; an abdication; a unitary
republic; a federal republic; a revolution in Cuba; two distinct and simultaneous
civil wars; a coup d’e´tat; another provisional rule and a new trial at regencia, and
 nally the restoration of the monarchy (Comellas, 1996: 221). These successive
crises left the 1874 Spanish State desperately short of funds (ibid.: 228) and it was
in this context that the Banco de Espana was granted the monopoly for the issue
of bank notes.
The Monopoly of Issue
There is a consensus amongst Spanish economic historians that the conferring
of the monopoly of emission to the Banco de Espana had less to do with the
dictates of monetary policy and more to do with its granting a 3% interest rate
loan of 125 million pesetas to the impoverished Spanish State (Herna´ndez, 1996;
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tortella, 1970: 287; 1995). Through the passage of a decree dated 19 March
1874, the right to issue bank notes was withdrawn from fourteen of the existing
 fteen bancos de emisio´n. The decree also meant that all the existing bancos de
emisio´n were to be transformed into branches of the Banco de Espana.5 The latter
itself had also to be transformed; for it had immediately grown from a bank which
until then operated with only two branches, into one, which by the end of 1874
was operating with seventeen branches.6 The following section therefore
describes how the Annual Reports of the Banco de Espana were prepared in
this light.
3. THE FORM AND CONTENT OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS
OF THE BANCO DE ESPAN˜A, 1874–94
The two characteristics that immediately stand out as extraordinary from the
review of the Annual Reports of the Banco de Espana over the twenty year period
following the granting of the monopoly are,  rst, the detailed amount of
disclosures contained therein and, second, the high degree of uniformity in
reporting (both in terms of content and volume of disclosures). The volume of
disclosures stands out as unusual given the low  nancial regulatory environment
that prevailed at the time. The existing Commercial Code (1885) which called for
the annual production and publication of the balance sheet for limited companies
gave no guidance as to its form or contents. Similarly, the reporting requirements
of the special legislation for banking institutions (the law of 19 October 1869;
Article 4, Paragraph 2) merely required all banks to publish their balance sheet in
the Madrid Gazette during the thirty day period following the date of its Annual
General Meeting. But again, this legislation was silent on the required disclo
sures. Yet, in the period examined, the Banco de Espana produced Annual
Reports that not only contained a detailed Balance Sheet, but also an Income
Statement and detailed information on its operations, including highly segmental
operational information about its branches. Moreover, such information was
provided consistently both in terms of its content and volume over the period
under review. These observations are particularly surprising given some of the
changes witnessed by the Bank during this period. For instance over this period
the Banco de Espana had changed from an institution owned by 2,321 share
holders represented by a share capital of 20 million pesetas, to one which by
December 1894 had over 5,000 shareholders represented by a share capital of
150 million pesetas. Whereas in March 1874, the operations of the Bank were
con ned to Madrid and its two smaller branch of ces operating in Alicante and
Valencia, by 1894, the Bank had established a network of over  fty eight
branches spread throughout Spain. During this period the Bank’s competitive
environment also underwent drastic change. Rather than operating as one of
Spain’s  fteen bancos de emisio´n, the Bank had emerged as the monopoly
supplier of bank notes in Spain. A further aspect of the Bank’s transformation
over this period was also the fact that in 1887 the Bank diversi ed its activities
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through its acquisition of 20% of the Spanish Tobacco Monopoly (Carmona and
Macõ´ as, 2001). As the analyses that follow will demonstrate, these factors did not
seem to signi cantly affect either the nature or the volume of disclosures
contained in the Annual Reports of the Bank. Below is a brief description of
the contents of the Annual Reports for  rst twenty years of the monopoly that
is, from the period spanning 1874 to 1894. Later, we compare these disclosure
practices with those which prevailed two years before the conferral of the
monopoly.
The Balance Sheet
Figure 1 presents the Balance Sheet for the year ended 1882. As can be seen, it is
presented in horizontal format with a high degree of disaggregation for all
categories of items. The only major change in the nature of the Balance Sheet
over the period is that up until 1884 the reported Balance Sheets are not
consolidated balances of the Bank and all its branches. Instead, they only re ect
the balances of the Madrid operations, and the net balance between Madrid and
other branches. The Balance Sheet of 1884 is the  rst for which consolidated
balances are presented. This perhaps re ects the gradual manner in which the
Bank’s monopoly of issue was introduced. As pointed out by Tortella (1970: 288),
it was not until 1884 that the Banco de Espana operated as the sole issuer of bank
Figure 1 Balance Sheet for the Banco de Espan˜a, as at 31 December 1882
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
notes in any true sense. In the period immediately after the granting of the
monopoly, each of the Bank’s branches issued their own bank notes and these
were only convertible at the branch of issue. In 1880 convertibility amongst
regional branches was achieved. Finally it was in 1884 that national convertibility
was attained. Effectively therefore prior to 1884, the branches of the Banco de
Espana operated as autonomous bancos de emisio´n in much the same manner as
they had operated prior to the granting of the monopoly. The year 1884
represented the  rst year in which the operational link between the Bank and
its branches was truly established. Analysis of the Bank’s Balance Sheet over this
period con rms that the State was the Bank’s principal customer, for during this
period an average of 50% of the Bank’s assets was devoted to the State lending.
Despite the fact that the post 1884 Annual Reports consolidated the balances
of the Madrid operations with those of the branches operating in the provinces,
for every year investigated, immediately following the Balance Sheet was a
statement which contained a summarized Balance Sheet of all of the branches.
This two part statement was produced in columnar format with the upper half
identifying categories of assets. The columns eleven in all represented assets;
with the branches (listed alphabetically) constituting individual rows. The lower
half of the schedule followed the same format but related instead to the
distribution of liabilities and other credits. Thus each row of this schedule’s
upper half indicated the values and constitution of assets for each branch, whereas
each row on the lower half indicated the values and constitution of individual
branch liabilities.
The Income Statement
Although the production of an Income Statement was not legally required, one
was included in each of the Annual Reports examined. The Bank’s Income
Statement for the year ended 30 December 1882 is presented in Figure 2. The net
results of the branches were included in income, which was measured as the
difference between revenues and variable costs, administrative costs and general
expenses. A charge for depreciation was also deducted. Taxation and dividends
were treated as distributions of income.
Very much like the Balance Sheet, the Bank’s Income Statements reveal a high
level of detail indicating the various sources of income and categories of
expenses. Interest Income re ected cash collections but was converted to an
accruals basis by including current year interest received in the previous year as a
source of revenue and by treating interest collected in the current year but
pertaining to the following year as a revenue deduction.
Notes and schedules on operations
The values on the Balance Sheet and the Income Statement were further
supported by a series of detailed schedules on operations and balances. These
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schedules constituted a signi cant portion of the Bank’s Annual Reports. For the
years 1874 and 1875, they were located within the discursive section of the
Reports. In subsequent years, the discursive material was slightly expanded and
referred to the schedules which were now located immediately after the  nancial
statements. The presentation of these schedules became standardized after 1875.
Table 1 lists those schedules that were consistently presented over the period and
gives a brief description of their formats and contents.
In addition to the standard schedules described in Table 1, other schedules or
statements appeared on an ad hoc basis. These seemed to have been presented in
a bid to justify operational changes made in the previous year or proposed for the
coming year.
The amount and level of disclosure that characterized the Annual Reports of
the Banco de Espana for the period 1874 94 rendered the operations of the Bank
highly transparent. In addition to presenting a detailed account of the operational
activities of the Madrid and other branches, the Report (in its discursive section)
gave lengthy discussions of signi cant events during the year and the manner
in which these events impacted the Bank. It also highlighted signi cant changes in
balances and provided seemingly credible explanations for these changes. Future
plans were also brie y discussed. The Annual Report of the Banco de Espana was
therefore a sizeable document. During the period 1874 to 1883, the report averaged
some thirty  ve pages in length. By 1885, it had reached seventy three pages
and by 1894 it was over 100 pages long. The growth in the size of the report,
Figure 2 Income Statements for the Banco de Espan˜a, 1882
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Standardized schedules presented in the Annual Reports of the Banco de Espan˜a,
1874 94
Title of schedules Brief description of contents
(i) Circulation of bank notes Gives information on the minimum and
maximum value of bank notes issuable by
each branch and the value actually issued.
Consistently has been the  rst
supplementary schedule.
(ii) Interest on lending and
discounting operations
Identi es for each branch (a) the number of
discount=loan transactions for the year,
(b) the principal values involved,
(c) the interest collected and (d) the total
value of collateral. For the Madrid operations
the interest amounts were directly traceable to
the Income Statement. For the provincial
branches, these amounts are traceable to
the branch net gains and losses statement.
(iii) Special current account
movements
Activity reports revealing amongst other things
(a) number of accounts opened during the
year, (b) number and value of deposits
existing at the end of the year, (c) the
number and value of withdrawals.
Information provided for both the Madrid
operations and the branches.
(iv) Current account movements
(v) Deposit account movements
(vi) Commissions earned on
giros and letters of credit
Discloses information on the principal
amounts and commissions earned from the
issue of giros and letters of credit during
the year for Madrid and all branches.
(vii) Changes in gold, silver and
coin balances
Explains movements in metallic resources for
the year. Additions were separately identi ed
by source, and depletions were identi ed by
destination (e.g. dividends, return of bank
notes etc.). The opening and closing balances
of each item (gold, silver and coinage) could
be traced to the prior and current years’
Balance Sheets, respectively.
(viii) Balances and movements in
other liquid funds
Similar to above.
(ix) Share movements Indicates the number of shares and investors
associated with each branch of the Bank.
Also reveals changes in the constitution of
these  gures over the year.
(x) Administrative costs Gives a breakdown of the administrative
cost associated with the Madrid operations.
Prior year comparatives are given. Signi cant
departures between current and previous
years’ amounts explained in the discursive
section of the Annual Report.
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however, substantially re ected the growth in the number of branches that the
Bank had created over the period. By the end of the century the Bank had
established a network of  fty eight branches. Increasingly many of these branches
were eligible to hold their own Annual General Meetings three months before that
of the Madrid.7 Increasingly therefore individual branch Annual Reports would
be included with the Bank’s Annual Report and this substantially accounted for
the increases in the size of the document. Though almost three times as large as it
was at the beginning of the period, left unchanged were the form, content and
structure already described.
4. FACTORS DRIVING DISCLOSURE PRACTICES OF THE
BANCO DE ESPAN˜A
The purpose of the above descriptive material has been to present some of the
salient features of the Annual Reports produced by the Banco de Espana for the
 rst twenty years that it operated as the monopoly supplier of bank notes in Spain.
The material has attempted to illustrate the high level of detail therein and the high
degree of standardization associated with these reports over the period. As was
previously mentioned, in the context of the low regulatory environment within
which these Annual Reports were produced, the level of detail and the consistency
with which the Bank produced such information are considered unusual. Our
purpose here is to consider the likely factors that might have given rise to what
seems to be an excessive level of disclosure practised by the Banco de Espana.
In characterizing the disclosure practices of the Banco de Espana as ‘exces
sive’, the term ‘excessive’ is used to describe two dimensions of disclosure:
(a) what is in fact disclosed and (b) the level of detail associated with what is
disclosed. The Bank’s continuous production of the Income Statement and the
prominence given to it in the Annual Reports would be an example of the former,
for the disclosure of such a statement was not legally required. An example of
second dimension of ‘excessive’ would be the high level of disaggregation
Table 1 (continued)
Title of schedules Brief description of contents
(xi) Branch administrative
expenses and gains
Presents information only on the branches and
not on Madrid operations. One column
reveals the administrative costs incurred by
each branch, and another reveals its results
(gain or loss).
(xii) Operations with the
Treasury
Series of schedules presenting information
on holdings of public debt.
(xiii) Values in suspense Schedule of suspense items for Madrid
operations and branches indicating opening
and closing balances as well as additions
and reductions.
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contained in the Balance Sheet; or the production of numerous schedules
designed to give a fuller understanding of the composition of  nancial statement
balances and the changes in those balances over the period.
A number of accounting studies have sought to identify the factors affecting a
 rm’s willingness to disclose more than what is legally required. Some studies
focus speci cally on voluntary disclosure in terms of what we describe as falling
into the  rst dimension of excessive such as the provision of pro t forecasts
(Brennan, 1999; Sudarsanam, 1991, 1995; Krinsky et al., 1988; Gray et al., 1991).
Others focus on the level of detail such as the provision of segmental information
(Aitken et al., 1997; Mitchell et al., 1995). In general, a range of factors has been
identi ed as providing managers with incentive to disclose excessively. Sengupta
(1998: 473), for instance, suggests that the incentives to disclose more in terms
of degree of detail, timeliness and clarity may be linked to a  rm’s desire to
lower its cost of borrowing. Other factors are related to the size and leverage of
the  rm (Bradbury, 1992), its ownership diffusion, the presence of minority
interest and the nature of the industry (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993). Most
of these factors relate to capital market phenomena. As will be explained later in
this paper, in the context of nineteenth century Spain, the role of capital market
monitoring in in uencing the disclosure practices of the Banco de Espana seem
inappropriate. Of these factors therefore we consider the industry factor as the
most probable to offer reasons for the excessiveness associated with the
disclosure practices of the Banco de Espana.
Industry practice
In brief the industry hypothesis argues that a  rm’s disclosure practices may be
excesive if the industry within which it operates is politically sensitive. Given the
importance of the  nancial sector to the national economy and also given the high
concentration of  nancial expertise in this sector, it is perhaps likely that banking
institutions in general might have been more progressive than other  rms with
respect to their disclosure practices. As a consequence, rather than being seen as
excessive, it is likely that the nineteenth century disclosure practices of the Banco
de Espana may have merely re ected those which prevailed in the Spanish  nancial
sector at that time. In order to establish whether this was the case, the Annual
Reports of the Banco de Bilbao, the Banco de Santander and the Banco de
Barcelona were examined. These banks, like the Banco de Espana, were major
bancos de emisio´n prior to the decree of 1874. They did not merge with the Banco
de Espana at that time, but instead continued to operatewithout the right of issue. A
review of the Annual Reports of these entities during an extended period would
shed some light on the practices common for the industry at that time. For the
Banco de Santander and the Banco de Barcelonawe reviewed their Annual Reports
of the period 1873 to 1894, and for the Banco de Bilbao, Annual Reports for the
period 1871 to 1877 were reviewed. Table 2 summarizes the  ndings.
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The general structure of these Annual Reports did not differ signi cantly from
that of the Banco de Espana. Each opened with a discursive section, which was
followed by their respective Balance Sheets. The Balance Sheets of the three
banks were prepared in much the same format as that of the Banco de Espana’s,
except that they were somewhat more condensed. In addition, as indicated in
Table 2, it seems to have been quite a common practice for nineteenth century
Spanish banks to prepare an Income Statement. The Banco de Barcelona and the
Banco de Santander produced their Income Statements in vertical format similar
to that of the Banco de Espana, and computed net gains in a similar manner, i.e.
after charging administrative expenses and expenses re ecting charges for
depreciation and the amortization of pre operating costs. The format adopted
by the Banco de Bilbao was somewhat different. It produced its statement of
gains and losses in a ‘T’ account format. All revenue items were listed as credits,
whereas debits to the account included not only expenses, but also other
distributions such as dividends and transfers to reserves. Hence, for the Banco
de Bilbao, the net gain or loss for the period is not immediately discernible from
the statement but has to be computed by carefully discriminating between those
entries that represent expenses and those representing distributions. None the less,
similar to the other banks, the Bilbao also did include as debits, amounts
representing charges for the depreciation of  xed assets.
With respect to the level of detail associated with the Income Statement, the
Bancos de Barcelona and Santander provide very little information on their
sources of revenue. Indeed for both banks, revenue is represented by only one line
item (compared to nine line items for the Banco de Espana in its 1875 Annual
Report, and eighteen in its 1882 Annual Report). For these banks it is therefore
impossible to determine the relative contribution to revenue from lending,
discounting and other activities. The Banco de Bilbao, however, was more
transparent with respect to its various sources of revenue, disclosing them in
four to  ve line items in its ‘T’ account. For all these banks, there was more
disclosure with respect to the various categories of expenses. These were detailed
in an average of  ve categories for the Banco de Barcelona and the Banco de
Bilbao, and seven categories for the Banco de Santander.
As to the inclusion of other information in the Annual Accounts, in all cases
there was a relative paucity of additional schedules and tables. With varying
degrees of detail, each of the Annual Accounts gave some additional information
on the movement of certain assets and liabilities, but in no case was the
information presented as detailed as that of the Banco de Espana. As illustrated
in Table 2, the Banco de Barcelona did discuss movements in its deposit and
current accounts. However, these discussions were limited to two or three
sentences which indicated the balances for the current and previous years, the
change for the period, and the number of new accounts opened and closed during
the period. With respect to the movements of its liquid resources, the Annual
Reports reviewed only mentioned the total value of payments made with these
funds. The super ciality of these discussions is further indicated by the fact that
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on average this discursive section constituted two pages of text. Throughout the
period examined, immediately following this material were two tables. The  rst
was an untitled table in which the quantitative information on deposits, current
accounts and liquid resources which was previously discussed in the text is
merely reproduced. The second table, titled Discount Operations, gives some
information on the discount operations for the period in terms of the number of
transactions, the value of transactions and various discount rates applied. The
value presumably relating to revenue earned on these transactions is, however, not
traceable to the Income Statement.
The Banco de Bilbao seemed to be more transparent about its activity. Its
10 12 page Annual Report opened with discussions on the movements of a
number of Balance Sheet items (see Table 2). These discussions went beyond that
of merely computing the change. Instead they attempted to explain the reasons for
the increase or decrease. Usually ten to twelve lines of text were devoted to
discussing each of these items. Immediately after the discursive material were two
tables which appeared throughout the period. The  rst was a six month report on
savings activity, indicating number and value of new accounts opened, the
number and value of accounts renewed for each of the six months prior to the
balance sheet date. This information was then reproduced on the subsequent
table, which gave a history of these items for every six month period since the
inception of the bank. None of the values on either of these tables related to the
 nancial statements. Instead these tables seemed to be designed to give readers an
idea of the savings trends with the bank.
The Annual Reports of the Banco de Santander were the least detailed of the
three. The discussion of the items listed in Table 2 was limited to a maximum of
two sentences which stated the balance for the current year and the increase or
decrease over the previous year. No explanations for the changes were given.
From 1882 onwards the only change to this format was the inclusion of a short
paragraph which explained the results for the period. At no time over the period
investigated were supplementary tables or schedules provided.
The review of disclosure practices of these major banking institutions suggests
that, whereas in terms of format and content, the Banco de Espana appeared to be
following a general trend within industry, with respect to the quantum of
disclosures, those of the Bank far exceeded that of its peers. This conclusion
holds for both the pre and post monopoly periods. Thus with respect to one
dimension of ‘excessive’ there seems to have been an industry in uence. That is
the provision of certain types of information beyond that which was required by
the law such as the Income Statement, and comparative information on current
and deposit accounts, notes in circulation etc. seemed to have been governed by
what prevailed in the industry. However, other factors seemed to have in uenced
the disclosure practices of the Banco de Espana, for as the above discussion has
revealed, the degree of detail with which the Banco de Espana provided such
information was far in excess of that which might have been usual for the
industry, thus it was indeed ‘excessive’.
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The terms of the monopoly
It is perhaps reasonable to expect that the conferral of the monopoly of issue to the
Banco de Espana might have imposed some degree of additional disclosure on the
Bank. The existing literature suggests two possible reasonswhy the conferral of the
monopoly may have caused the Banco de Espana to produce more detailed
 nancial information. The  rst relates to the size hypothesis, which suggests that
the disclosure practices of monopolistic  rms are governed by their desire to reduce
political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Alternatively, the contracting
literature suggests that the disclosure practices of the Banco de Espana may
have been in uenced by speci c conditions associated with the granting of the
monopoly. In the context of the Banco de Espana, the  rst argument seems
somewhat inappropriate, given that it was the State itself that had initiated and had
indeed sanctioned the monopoly. Thus it seems unlikely that the disclosure
practices adopted by the Banco de Espanawere an attempt to reduce the likelihood
of its loss of monopoly. The second argument therefore seems to hold more
promise. However, this is not immediately evident in the terms of the 1874 decree.
Whilst the decree did place operational limits on the Bank which were
expressed in terms of Balance Sheet values, it made no mention of additional
disclosure requirements. Speci cally the decree  xed a capital ceiling of
150 million pesetas and limited the issue of bank notes to  ve times the value
of capital. Later these limits were adjusted in an attempt to meet the budgetary
requirements of the State. Thus in 1890, a new law permitted the Bank to double
the maximum amount of notes that it was permitted to issue.8 Accompanying this
increased  exibility to issue notes were a number of restrictions, which again
were based on Balance Sheet variables. These restrictions concerned the relation
ship between the Bank’s metallic assets and the value of bank notes issuable; the
relationship between gold and other metallic assets; and the relationship between
liquid assets and current liabilities.9 It is perhaps reasonable to assert therefore,
that the detail with which the Bank prepared its Balance Sheet, and the emphasis
placed on showing the constitution of certain categories of assets and liabilities
might have been on account of its need to signal to the State that it was adhering
to the terms of the monopoly.
We therefore conducted a review of the Bank’s Annual Reports for the two
years prior to the conferral of the monopoly so as to determine the extent to which
this argument can be supported.
Annual Reports of the Banco de Espan˜a, 1872–73
The Annual Reports for the years ending 1872 and 1873 bear the same level of
detail as those produced during the post monopoly period. Accompanying the
Bank’s main  nancial statements were Balance Sheets of the Bank’s two existing
branches (Valencia and Alicante) as well as segmental information on their
operations. The latter included information on discount and loan transactions,
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movements in current accounts and metal deposits, administrative expenses, gains
and losses for the year, and transactions in giros and letters of credit. Moreover,
the examination revealed that ten of the thirteen standard schedules identi ed in
Table 1 were present in the Annual Reports of 1872 and 1873 although they were
not displayed as separate schedules but were instead presented as tables within the
discursive section of the reports. The Annual Reports for 1872 and 1873 were 32
and 33 pages in length, respectively. These Reports, both with respect to the
nature and quantum of information disclosed, were identical to those produced in
the period spanning 1874 to 1894. It is thus dif cult to conclude that the conferral
of the monopoly via the decree of 19 March 1874 signi cantly affected the
regime of disclosure practised by the Banco de Espana.
The State of the Bank and the Bank of the State
The above analyses have indicated that throughout the period 1872 94, the
disclosure practices of the Banco de Espana did not undergo signi cant change.
Indeed the sameness in the nature and quantum of disclosure emerged as a
surprising result given the signi cant changes in the size and nature of the Bank
and its competitive environment during this period. It has been suggested that the
nature of the disclosures made by the Bank was to a very large extent in uenced by
whatmay have been standard practice in the industry. However, the detailed manner
in which these disclosures were made was far in excess of industry practice.
Importantly, it was noted that this level of detail prevailed both in the pre and post
monopoly era. None of the factors identi ed by the literature as in uencing
disclosure seem able to explain the lack of change in the disclosure practices of
the Banco de Espana over the period 1872 to 1894. The most popularly espoused
explanation for a  rm’s tendency to disclose excessively is the signalling argument.
Brie y, this argument states that managers have incentives to voluntarily disclose
information because such disclosures serve to (a) signal their effective and ef cient
management and (b) reduce the perceived riskiness of the business which they
manage. Voluntary disclosure therefore serves both to distinguish good managers
from poor managers and to reduce a  rm’s cost of capital.
In the context of nineteenth century Spain neither of these arguments serve to
explain the Banco de Espana’s disclosure practice. In the  rst place, in nineteenth
century Spain there existed a narrow elite who circulated within the ranks of
public administration, corporate management and the military (Carasa, 1999). It
was not unusual to observe the movement of one individual from high public
of ce in one year, to corporate management in another, and then resuming a role
in public of ce or the military soon after (Ringrose, 1996). Closure and rigidity
therefore characterized the market for corporate managerial expertise in
nineteenth century Spain. In such a context, voluntary disclosure as a means of
ensuring managerial job security was of little value. The second reason for the
failure of the signalling argument to explain the case of the Banco de Espana
relates to the inapplicability of capital market phenomena to this environment.
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Although during our observation period the shares of the Banco de Espana were
listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, the cost of capital argument collapses for
two reasons. First, is the fact that the Stock Exchange was not a vehicle for
providing capital to the nineteenth century Spanish corporate sector. Indeed
during this period, the Madrid Stock Exchange was primarily devoted to the
trading of public debt (ICACBM, 1981). Second, as extant studies of nineteenth
century Spain reveal, during this period ownership of the corporate sector was in
the hands of a small capitalist elite (Cruz, 1996, 2000; de la Fuente, 2000;
Ringrose, 1996; Tedde, 1974, 1984, 1988). Within the banking sector, share
ownership was highly concentrated; shareholders had intimate knowledge of the
 nancial operations of their businesses and directors held substantial share
holdings (Mateo del Peral, 1974; Anes, 1974). It seems likely, therefore, that the
target audience of the Bank’s Annual Reports was not its shareholders, but instead
the State. We believe that a plausible explanation for the constancy in the Bank’s
disclosure practices over the period thus lay in the nature of the relationship
between this institution and the State.
As the history of the Bank reveals at every juncture in its life where it was faced
with certain demise, the State had intervened and had secured its resuscitation.10
Thus full disclosure of the state of the Bank whether perilous or not could
never be ‘costly’ to the Bank (managers or shareholders). Indeed such transpar
ency may have served to further endear the State towards the Bank, reducing the
State’s uncertainty about its operations, increasing its con dence in the Bank as
the manager of the public purse. The disclosure practices of the Banco de Espana
thus ensured that the State at all times was fully cognizant of the state of the Bank,
and this ensured the Bank’s continuing role as the Bank of the State.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper adds to a growing body of research which seeks to study nineteenth
century disclosure practices. Such studies are useful because given the low
regulatory environment that prevailed in the nineteenth century, greater light can
be shed on the incentives of companies to voluntarily disclose information. The
disclosure practices of the Banco de Espana between the period of 1872 and 1894
were studied because of the signi cant changes that the institution underwent
during that period. The study revealed that despite changes in the size and nature
of its operations, and in the nature of its competitive environment, the content and
volume of the Bank’s disclosures remained largely unchanged. The low  nancial
reporting regulatory context in which the Bank operated rendered its disclosures
‘excessive’ both in terms of what was disclosed and the level of detail associated
with the disclosures. Whilst the nature of the industry explained ‘excessive
disclosure’ in terms of what was disclosed, it did not provide an explanation for
the detailed level of disclosures. This paper has argued that none of the
established factors for such behaviour could explain the disclosure practices of
the Banco de Espana. Instead it has suggested that its disclosure practices may
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have been linked the historic role which the Bank has played as the principal
banker of the State. This observation, though somewhat tentative, has served to
unmask the  rm State relationship as a possible determinant of  nancial
disclosure in contexts where the role of capital markets is signi cantly less
than that in the well studied Anglo American environments.
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NOTES
1 Admittedly in the case of Toms (1998), it is argued that  nancial accountability was
more in uenced by the social character of share ownership than by the mere separation
of ownership and control.
2 In reality the bankruptcy of the Bank was brought about by the fact that over 90% of its
total assets represented public debt which had been repudiated by the  nancially
distressed Spanish State (Santilla´n, 1865).
3 Isabel II was established in 1844 and almost immediately established stiff rivalry with
the San Fernando. By the end of the 1840s the stiff competition between the two banks
put both on the brink of bankruptcy (Tortella, 1995).
4 This was so given that a large part of their resources were in the form of short term
demand notes and current accounts.
5 This was, however, strenuously resisted by  ve of the existing bancos de emisio´n: the
Banco de Barcelona, the Banco de Reus, the Banco de Santander, the Banco de
Tarragona and the Banco de Bilbao. The latter, however,  nally merged with the Banco
de Espan˜a in 1878 whilst the rest continued to operate without the rights of issue
(Herna´ndez, 1996: 153).
6 The process of absorption was effected through a share for share exchange with the
shareholders of the affected banks (Tortella, 1970: 287). This resulted in an augmenta
tion of the Bank’s capital from 20,000,000 escudos at the end of 1872, to 98,006,000
pesetas at the end of 1875.
7 By the Bank’s 1874 statutes, branches which had thirty or more shareholders owning
more than twenty shares were allowed to have their own Annual General Meeting three
months before that of Madrid. Later, in 1882, this number of shares was reduced to ten.
As a result, more branches were eligible to hold an AGM and their Annual Reports
were then included in the Annual Report of the Bank.
8 Thus raising it to ten times the value of capital.
9 Speci cally the operational restrictions were that: (a) metallic assets (coins, gold and
silver) be equivalent to one third of the volume of bank notes in issue, (b) half of the
Bank’s metallic assets must be in gold and (c) the sum of bank notes and deposits could
not exceed the sum of liquid assets.
10 This was despite the fact that, over the life of the Bank, the Spanish State itself was not
a constant entity.
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